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―Rival visions of reality‖: An analysis of the framing of Boko Haram in Nigerian 
newspapers and Twitter 
 
Framing analysis has been on the communication research agenda for several 
decades. Scholars have explored how communicators, especially journalists, use 
news frames to influence our perception and knowledge of political issues and public 
events.  But despite its popularity as a research tool, framing remains problematic at 
several levels due to the abstract nature of the concept. As Maher (2001:84) 
observed, framing ‗has proved to be an elusive concept to measure‘. Other pitfalls in 
the application of the multipronged concept have been identified by some scholars 
(Carragee and Roef, 2004, Gorp, 2007, Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016). In a 
2009 study, for example, Jorg Matthes highlighted four problems of framing 
research, namely: ―lack of operational precision, the descriptive focus of many 
analyses, neglect of visuals, and insufficient reliability reporting‖ (Matthes, 2009: 
349). In addition, several studies have raised questions about reliability and validity 
of framing as a methodological approach for analysing media content (Hertog & 
McLeod, 2001; Scheufele, 1999; Tankard, 2001); and the propensity for ‗researcher 
bias‘ (Gorp, 2005:503).  
To address the perceived weaknesses in framing analysis, there has been a surge in 
the application of statistical procedures and use of software in studies.  For example, 
Matthes and Kohring (2008) employed hierarchical cluster analysis in the framing of 
biotechnology in the New York Times; Burscher, Vliegenhart and de Vreese (2016) 
applied partitioning cluster analysis and automatic sentiment analysis in their 
examination of news about nuclear power; and Frederick, Pegorano and Burch 
(2016) carried out thematic analysis of news articles and tweets about the Sochi 
Olympics using the Leximancer software.  Against the backdrop of this expanded 
approach to framing, this study applies statistical approaches proposed by Matthes & 
Kohring (2008) and Frederick, Pegorano & Burch (2016) in an examination of frames 
in the coverage of an archetypal political conflict – terrorism - in newspapers and 
Twitter. With the media framing of Boko Haram, a transnational terrorist group, as its 
focus, this study identifies frames in legacy and social media platforms‘ coverage of 
the group in a selection of Nigerian newspapers and on Twitter. Comparing the two 
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platforms is not empirically straightforward because these platforms operate on 
significantly different ethos, with Twitter driven by subjectivity and newspapers 
normatively objective. However, a comparison is justified because it reflects the 
hybrid nature of the media environment and acknowledges how the participatory 
norms embedded in social media impact on public discourse.  The comparison was 
also informed by the shift in news production and consumption processes in 
response to technological developments. All the newspapers used in the study enjoy 
online visibility and are, therefore, not spatially limited. From that standpoint, it could 
be argued that geographical location is not critical in terms of reach and readership 
as the papers are globally accessible, just like Twitter.    
The main aims of the study are (1) to explore the viability of new approaches in the 
identification of frames in the coverage of Boko Haram and (2) to illustrate how the 
interface of legacy and social media platforms can unearth divergences and reveal 
―rival visions of ‗reality‘‖ (Norris, Kem & Just, 2003: 5).  
Framing, Media, and Terrorism  
Framing analysis in the context of terrorism is a dynamic research process that 
investigates how frames about terrorist organisations, terrorist attacks, or individuals 
linked with terrorist activities, are produced and sustained over time. It is also 
concerned with ways in which the media shape social reality and/or influence public 
knowledge about terrorism (Norris, Kem & Just, 2003).  Interest in this area of 
research has grown following the events of September 9, 2001 and the ensuing ‗war 
on terror‘. However, terrorism is still an ―essentially contested concept‖ (Gallie, 
1956:169), which makes it prone to ―opportunistic appropriation‖ (Saul, 2008: 3), 
resulting in quips like one man‘s terrorist being another man‘s freedom fighter. 
Terrorism, in the context of this study, is conceptualised as a form of political 
violence that:  
Is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear; is directed at 
a wider target than the immediate victims; inherently involves attacks on 
random or symbolic targets, including civilians; is considered by the society in 
which it occurs as 'extra-normal', that is in the literal sense that it violates the 
norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent; and is used primarily, though 
not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, 
communities or specific social groups (Wilkinson, 1977:51) 
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It is also a tactic adopted by both state and non-state actors to intimidate and 
instigate anxiety (Morin, 2016). Even though terrorism has become an increasingly 
critical subject of public discourse, as well as an important area of research since the 
defining event of September 2001, it is not a new social problem. Some scholars 
contend that epochs of terrorism are interlinked and exist in a continuum (Copeland, 
2001; Tucker, 2001; Crenshaw, 2008). The modern form of terrorism defies 
traditional rules of engagement. For instance, this method of political conflict can be 
undertaken by well-established command and control structured organisations or 
lone wolves. ―Unlike other forms of violence, its target is not its immediate victims, 
but a larger audience. Its main goal is not to harm or punish the immediate victims 
but to send an intimidating message to a target population, state, or organisation‖ 
(Morin, 2016:3). Thus, the coverage of this ―new form of war‖ (Margolis, 2004: 403) 
has attracted the attention of media scholars because it allows for an exploration of 
different perspectives presented by various political actors.   
As information purveyors, the news media play a pivotal role during political conflicts 
by serving as a dais for contest over meaning. This is particularly critical given the 
media-terrorism symbiosis.  Terrorists engage the media to enhance their tactical 
and strategic aims as well as for extensive coverage of their exploits, without which 
their efforts will be sans meaning (Martin, 1985), and the media create a spectacle 
out of terrorist attacks because they meet newsworthiness criteria such as ―novelty, 
conflict, social impact, importance, consequence and human interest‖ (Zhang, 
Shoemaker & Wang, 2013: 451).  Yet, unlike legitimate state actors who are granted 
unrestricted access to the media, terrorist organisations can only attract coverage 
through the back door, depending on the intensity of their violence (Kampf, 2014). 
While unprecedented changes in the communication ecology have altered the 
media-terrorism interface, the news media are still major battlefields for the 
propagation of information and through them terrorists can achieve their goal of 
inflicting terror on an audience beyond the locations of their attacks.   
The emergence of social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, 
has enabled terrorist organisations to disseminate their messages without the 
mediating influence of legacy media platforms. The unique features of social media 
platforms – resistance to control, high interactivity, ease of-use, affordability, 
suitability for visual and textual content – make them ideal for recruiting, fundraising, 
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training, communication, strategizing and execution of attacks (Weimann, 2006; 
Galily, Yarchi & Tamir, 2015:999). These platforms allow for the presentation of 
competing, counter-establishment, or dissident frames and content produced and 
packaged by ‗produsers‘ (Bruns & Schmidt, 2011:4) and ‗terrorpreneurs‘, who are 
not bound by journalistic standards. The growing importance of social media 
platforms in the dissemination of terrorist narratives point to a need to interrogate 
their influence on the framing of political conflict as these platforms tend to serve as 
soapboxes for people who congregate around homogenous ideologies. The 
perceived success of these platforms as radicalisation and recruitment centres is 
emblematic of their capacity to influence the perception of their audiences.  
Context of study: Nigeria and Boko Haram 
Nigeria, Africa‘s most populous country, is a divided society that is polarized along 
geo-religious cleavages. The north is perceived to be predominantly Muslim and the 
south is home to mostly Christians. This polarisation, which can be attributed to the 
country‘s colonial history, fuels competition for ―the control of state power, resource 
allocation, and citizenship‖ (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005:4). Political conflicts over the 
years have exacerbated the divides to the point of eruptions such as the 30-month 
civil war (1967-1970). However, even though the country had experienced different 
manifestations of political violence that could have been recognised as terrorist acts, 
terrorism was not acknowledged as a threat until the emergence of Boko Haram 
(Ette, 2016).  
Officially known as Jama‘atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda‘wati wal Jihad (People committed 
to the propagation of the Prophet‘s Teaching and Jihad), Boko Haram has engaged 
the Nigerian state in an asymmetrical warfare since the turn of the century. The 
group was initially regarded as a domestic threat, but it has since breached national 
boundaries into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad and has emerged as a transnational 
security threat. In 2011, the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security noted an evolution in the group‘s capabilities and asserted that its reach had 
gone beyond Nigeria (US House of Representatives, 2011). Like other terrorist 
organisations associated with Islam, Boko Haram employs violence as a strategy to 
advance its anti-western ideology and attempts to establish an Islamic caliphate in 
Nigeria (Adesoji, 2014). 
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The group has carried out several large-scale attacks in some parts of Nigeria, 
including the bombing in 2011 of the Nigerian police headquarters and the United 
Nations‘ House, both in Abuja, and the Baga massacre in 2015, during which more 
than 2000 civilians were killed. The sect‘s campaign of terror has led to more than 
17,000 deaths (Obaji, 2016); the displacement of over two million people (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2016); and a host of other socio-political and 
economic problems in Nigeria. Some of its atrocities have made headlines around 
the world and the kidnapping of more than 200 Chibok secondary schoolgirls in April 
2014 earned the group global denunciation and triggered the #bringbackourgirls 
Twitter campaign. 
Boko Haram began to seize Nigerian territories in 2013 and by January 2015, had 
gained control of about fourteen local government areas in the north-eastern part of 
the country, which led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the main theatres 
of the insurgency – Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (Bappah, 2016).  However, it 
would seem that recent military-based counterinsurgency efforts have curtailed its 
spread.  According to President Muhammadu Buhari, all Nigerian territories had 
been recovered from the insurgents by February 2016.  However, the veracity of this 
claim has been challenged by David Rodriguez, the US Africa Command 
(USAFRICAOM) leader (Sahara Reporters, 2016).   Still, to the President‘s credit, 
some Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned to their homelands 
(Premium Times, 2017) and Sambisa forest, the former stronghold of the insurgents 
has been recaptured (Broomfield, 2016).  Yet, following recent bombings in 
Maiduguri, the epicentre of the Boko Haram war, there are concerns that the threat 
posed by the group is far from over. 
Like other international terrorist groups such as Daesh, Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, 
Boko Haram employs suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IED), 
vehicle-borne improvised devices (VBIED), kidnappings and beheadings (Okpaga, 
Chijioke & Eme, 2012) as weapons of attack. The nature and magnitude of these 
attacks result in extensive media coverage on legacy platforms. The group also uses 
social media platforms including YouTube and Twitter to publicise its successes. 
As noted earlier, a great deal of framing research in communication has focused on 
analysis of media content and this is reflected in Boko Haram related literature. Many 
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studies have focused on the framing of the group in Nigerian newspapers (Okoro & 
Odoemelam, 2013; Ngwu, Ekwe & Chiara, 2015; Obaje, 2017); British newspapers 
(Ette, 2016); and broadcast media (Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016; Jibrin & Jimoh 2017). 
On the whole, while some studies have targeted legacy media content, there is a 
dearth of social media analysis; the application of computer-based approaches; and 
inductive framing analysis. Here, we bridge this gap by examining content on both 
traditional and alternative media. We apply automated approaches to enhance the 
reliability and validity of our study; and allow frames to emerge from the text by 
adopting an inductive approach. 
Methodological approach 
The data for this study have been collected as part of a larger study on the framing 
of Boko Haram in the Nigerian press and on Twitter over a six-month period.  Here, 
we present data for the month of January 2017 on Twitter and in four Nigerian 
newspapers – The Guardian, Punch, Leadership, and Daily Trust.  Although there 
were no ‗what a story-moments‘ in terms of terrorists attacks during this period, the 
socio-political and economic situation in the country kept Boko Haram in the news. 
For example, President Buhari‘s New Year‘s speech highlighted the group‘s activities 
and government‘s counterinsurgency programme, which, against the backdrop of the 
economic condition in the country raised questions about the cost of combating Boko 
Haram. The military‘s botched air strike of a refugee camp that resulted in the death 
of more than 200 IDPs ignited concerns about the safety of victims of terrorist 
attacks and the impact of the group‘s activities on the country.  
The newspapers selected for this study represent the two dominant publishing hubs 
in Nigeria. As outlined earlier, the country is polarised along ethno-regional and 
religious divides. The publishing hubs reflect these cleavages with Daily Trust and 
Leadership representing the northern hub while the southern hub is represented by 
The Guardian and The Punch. Portable document formats of The Punch, Leadership 
and Daily Trust were obtained from paid-for subscription services; while The 
Guardian‘s content was accessed on the newspaper‘s website – www.guardian.ng.  
A basic search using ‗Boko Haram‘; its abbreviated version, ‗B‘Haram‘; and the 
known names of its leaders, ‗Abubakar Shekau‘, ‗Darul Tawheed‘, and ‗Abu Musab 
al-Barnawi‘; generated a total of 633 articles.  
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In order to identify frames in newspaper coverage of the group, we adopted Matthes 
and Kohring‘s (2008:263) approach, which conceptualises ―a frame as a certain 
pattern in a given text that is composed of several elements‖, that can be identified 
through a statistical technique – hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA).  These elements 
can be pre-defined to serve as variables in a manual coding process. Frames are 
those clusters that emerge from the HCA.  Thus, as part of the larger study a coding 
frame was designed, undergirded by Entman‘s (1993) definition. The frame elements 
- problem definition (PD), causal interpretation (CI), moral evaluation (ME), and 
treatment recommendation (TR)], were crucial to the effective implementation of this 
method because they served as the variables in the coding process. 
The unit of analysis was the article in which at least one of Entman‘s frame elements 
was visible.  This was based on the realisation that frame elements were not visible 
in all the articles. Thus, only pertinent articles, 393 (about 62 percent of the originally 
retrieved articles) were appropriate for further analysis.   
See Chart 1 for details.   
 
Chart 1: Study population 
 
The problem definition was operationalised under three variables: ACTOR, 
IDENTITY and IMPACT. These described the main actors in the articles, their 
160 
167 
173 
133 
78 
123 
109 
83 
DAILY TRUST GUARDIAN LEADERSHIP PUNCH 
Number of Articles retrieved Number of articles for the cluster analysis
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labelling of the sect, and the effect of the activities of the sect on the Nigerian state. 
The causal interpretation element consisted of two variables:  CAUSAL 
ATTRIBUTION, which described the parties responsible for the emergence or 
sustenance of Boko Haram, and BENEFIT ATTRIBUTION, the person/parties 
responsible for the gains against the insurgents. The moral evaluation variable 
described how different frame sponsors perceived the activities of Boko Haram. It 
was concerned with the perception of the activities of the group as expressions of 
the Islamic faith. The treatment recommendation variable spelled out what solutions 
were advocated for resolving the Boko Haram conflict. The coding categories applied 
were ―mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and independent‖ (Matthes & Kohring, 2008: 
266), with a mean reliability of 0.94, and a range of 0.7 to 1.0 based on Holsti‘s 
formula.  These original variables (categoricals) were converted to dummy variables, 
to allow for further statistical analysis.  To also ensure proper results, only variables 
with a frequency of five percent or more, were included in the final stages of the data 
analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008:268). 
In line with Matthes and Kohring‘s (2008) design, data from the coding process was 
analysed through a statistical procedure – Cluster Analysis. A cluster analysis 
presents one way of making sense of complex data and is especially effective if the 
objective is to break down the said data into smaller units that could facilitate 
meaning creation (Estivill-Castro & Yang, 2004). A cluster analysis according to 
Rokack and Maimon (2005:322) ―groups data instances into subsets in such a 
manner that similar instances are grouped together, while different instances belong 
to different groups‖.  The goal of this procedure, was therefore, to locate smaller 
homogeneous groups and distinguish them from more heterogeneous subsets 
(Berry & Linoff, 1997). Here, the approach was applied to identify different groups of 
articles that shared similar frame elements.  Since each group/cluster represented a 
frame, the prevalent frame for each of the newspapers was the cluster category that 
indicated the greatest difference between group and the least difference within group 
members.  
Although there are assorted clustering methods, the hierarchical cluster analysis has 
been adopted because there are statistical measures available (the scree plot), to 
guide the suitable number of clusters.  The agglomerative strand of the hierarchical 
cluster analysis, specifically the Ward‘s method, was also selected because it starts 
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out by showing each article as being unique, while tracing its membership in larger 
groupings via a Dendrogram – a tree-like diagram that indicates the ―nested 
grouping of objects and similarity levels at which groupings change‖ (Rokack & 
Maimon, 2005:331).  An examination of the Dendrogram, the scree plot and the table 
of means and standard deviation facilitated the identification of frames.  Variables 
with higher means indicated the frame elements that were given more salience, 
while lower mean values represented elements that were given lesser prominence.  
 
Twitter 
The dataset from Twitter was mined using Mozdeh‘s Twitter Time Series Analysis 
software.  The search terms ‗Boko Haram‘, ‗B‘Haram‘, ‗Abubakar Shekau‘, ‗Darul 
Tawheed‘, and ‗Abu Musab al-Barnawi‘ were used to harvest 127,180 tweets from 
41,849 unique contributors in January 2017. All Boko Haram-related tweets were 
considered relevant as there was no attempt to apply location filters. This was an 
acknowledgement of the global nature of media platforms in a digital age. The tweets 
were exported into the Leximancer software because the text-mining tool has a 
capacity to analyses large quantities of data from social media sites (Sotiriadou, 
Brouwers & Le, 2012, Bal et al, 2012). The Leximancer text analytics software is not 
only a veritable tool for the analysis of qualitative data (Cretcheley et al, 2010), it is 
also capable of ―providing a basic content analysis with descriptive statistics, …and 
able to discover the key discourses or concepts within a text, what they are made up 
of and how those discourses stand in relation to others within the text (Isakhan 
(2005:9). 
The software produces a ‗concept map‘, which indicates the dominant themes and 
their relationship within a data set. In addition, its application of statistics-based 
algorithm has been known to reduce the reliability and validity challenges of manual 
content analysis (Biroscak et al, 2017). As in most computer-based approaches, we 
interpreted and discussed the generated themes in a meaningful way by firstly, 
exploring actual tweets to gain a robust understanding of what the themes – 
―reoccurring concepts within text that provide general meaning to a reader‖ 
represented (Frederick, Pegoraro & Burch, 2016:802).  Secondly, we employed an 
axial coding strategy to reduce themes to frames, based on their homogeneity 
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(Benaquisto, 2008). The labelling of the frames was carried out to reflect ―the 
emergent context‖ (Frederick, Pegoraro & Burch, 2016:802). 
 
Results and discussion 
This study set out to answer two key questions: How was Boko Haram framed in 
legacy media represented by four Nigerian newspapers? How was the group framed 
in social media represented by Twitter? The idea was to test if an analysis of the two 
platforms would produce comparable frames. 
 
The framing of BH in the Nigerian Press 
Pulled together, the frame elements in newspaper articles delineated four clusters. 
The biggest cluster, which comprises 207 articles, produced a frame that we termed 
social consequences. It was prevalent in three of the newspapers: Leadership, The 
Guardian and Daily Trust. Articles in this cluster focused on the vicious nature of 
Boko Haram attacks and the traumatic impact of their activities on citizens. The 
stories also captured the role of Boko Haram in Nigeria‘s humanitarian crises and the 
harrowing experiences of child soldiers forcefully recruited by the sect. As one article 
reported, some of the child soldiers saw ―their parents killed, most often before their 
very eyes, their sisters taken away and their homes set ablaze before they were 
forcefully co-opted by Boko Haram to fight alongside them‖ (Abubakar 2017, para 
19). A report published by The Guardian on January 6, 2017, outlined how ―the 
Northeast region of Nigeria has suffered severe humanitarian crisis as a result of 
Boko Haram insurgency. This resulted in drastic decline in socio-economic activities 
including farming, pastoralism, commerce and social interactions among the 
populace especially in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.‘ (Datti, 2017, para 1).  
The second frame, War against Boko Haram, consists of ninety-three articles in 
which all the newspapers framed Boko Haram insurgents as outliers engaged in a 
senseless conflict with the Nigerian state.  The articles described the strategies of 
the Nigerian armed forces to contain the rampage of Boko Haram. For example, in 
an interview with the Daily Trust, Lieutenant General Tukur Y. Buratai, the chief 
commandant in the war against Boko Haram, described how the Nigerian military 
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ousted the insurgents from their strongholds, an event which the Daily Trust had 
described as ―The Great Victory in Sambisa‖ (―The Great Victory in Sambisa‖, 2017, 
January 1). Similarly, in a Christmas message, President Buhari celebrated ―the fall 
of ―Camp Zairo,‘‘ the last stronghold of the Boko Haram terrorists in Sambisa Forest, 
and commended the military for their exploits against the insurgents (Guardian, 
January 4, 2017)  
The third frame, which was labelled economic consequences, describes the 
economic toll of Boko Haram‘s activities on the Nigerian state.  It was prevalent in 
the Daily Trust and The Punch and detailed the economic cost of tackling Boko 
Haram. For example, the Daily Trust reported that the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of the north-east where the impact of the conflict was most evident 
would cost the country about 121 billion naira (£27 billion). Some reports in The 
Punch quoted political actors who claimed that ―the state suffered economically from 
the insurgency, causing the flow of investment to nosedive‘ and that setbacks in 
agricultural production caused by the Boko Haram crisis had cut the state‘s monthly 
internally generated revenue from N1bn to less than N200m‖ (Livinus, 2017: p.42).  
The smallest cluster consists of twenty-eight articles that identified members of Boko 
Haram as Islamic fundamentalists, which meant their activities were construed as 
being expressions of their Islamic faith. This frame was labelled Morality and was 
used to explain the religious or moral context of the activities of Boko Haram. . 
According to de Vreese (2005:56), ―the morality frame interprets an event or issue in 
the contexts of religious or moral prescriptions.‖ This frame was visible in papers 
published in the southern hub and echoed the fact that ―members of the group 
expound radical views and contempt for Western civilization; preach against Western 
way of life and values and campaign to spread extremist Islamist ideas across 
Nigeria through violence‖ (Ette, 2016:457). The group was accused of carrying out 
―dastardly and ungodly acts,‖ which resulted in the ‗killing of thousands of Christians 
and destruction of hundreds of churches and over 50,000 homes‘ (The Punch, 2 
January 2017, p.12) 
The framing of Boko Haram on Twitter 
The Leximancer concept map produced seventeen dominant themes from 127,180 
Boko Haram related tweets, which morphed into three frames through an axial 
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coding procedure.  One of the frames was new and invisible in the newspapers. The 
three frames were: War against Boko Haram, Morality and War against Women. As 
noted already, two of these frames were similar to the frames identified in the 
newspapers. However, the focus of the clusters was different from narratives in the 
newspapers.  For example, the war against Boko Haram frame on Twitter was 
concerned with winners and losers, and the role of President Buhari and the military 
in the ouster of the sect. Tweets in this category described the war as an internecine 
conflict, especially after a botched air strike by the Nigerian military on a refugee 
camp. To some commentators, the military was equally culpable of killing innocent 
civilians.   A tweet claimed: ―The Nigerian Military has killed as many innocent people 
as Boko Haram in 2 years - RT@Batarhe.  Some tweets made the president and the 
military objects of ridicule by framing them as ‗losers‘: RT @Amaka_Ewko in 
particular regularly mocked the president‘s claim of victory over the insurgents, 
especially after a Boko Haram flag that the military said was captured from the 
insurgents was put on display. @Amak_Ewko responded: ―Buhari‘s Army can‘t arrest 
Boko Haram members but their flag.  Meanwhile the group is on the move;‖ ―Biafra 
Today: Buhari Caught Lying Again After Raising Fake Boko Haram Flag in Aso 
Rock, Got exposed by IPOB.‖  
The Morality frame, which was also prevalent in newspapers published in the 
southern hub, interpreted Boko Haram‘s activities in the context of Islam. Tweets 
associated Boko Haram with other terrorist organisations such as ISIS, which claim 
to be representatives of true Islam. The tweets highlighted the atrocities of Boko 
Haram as expressions of their religious beliefs: [RT @pmclauth: ISIS & Boko Haram 
taking sex-slaves, is no different from what goes on in Bradford & Luton. All in core 
Islamic texts], [Daily drawing. Details: DSS confirms arrest of Abu Musab Al-Barnawi 
ISIS Recognised Boko Haram leader], [@TheLoneVenda @zithabb Well, Boko 
Haram, Isis , Saudi Arabia, Yemen etc all exercise Sharia…it's inhumane…can't let 
that spread, can we?], [@pmggal Entire Muslims are terrible..no matter…its 
ISIS..Boko Haram just want to kill u.@iSlaveTrolls @finite_planet @SarishkaSingh]. 
The war against women frame, which was only prevalent in Twitter, was used to 
describe how women and girls are the primary victims of the insurgents.  Tweets 
focused on Boko Haram‘s sexual and gender-based violence and how kidnapped 
women are turned into sexual slaves, raped, and impregnated: [Boko Haram are 
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nothing but sexual pests preying on young girls. A bunch of paedophiles], [Everyone 
suffered Boko Haram's kidnapping and sexual slavery, including young Nigerian 
girls], [Must read: "Captivity bonding" of women and young girls (youngest 11 yrs) 
under Boko Haram], [Heart Breaking Story: I Was Raped, I Have Three Kids for 
Three Terrorists – 15-year-old Boko Haram Escapee Tells Story …], [Boko Haram 
Jihadists Teach Boy Soldiers How to Rape Women].  The tweets also highlighted 
how  women are deployed as weapons of war: [RT @UKInfidel: #IslamExposed: 
#BokoHaram Scum Use Little Girl as #SuicideBomber in #Maiduguri], [Army kills 
three female suicide bombers, arrests Boko Haram leader on wanted list], [RT 
@AshleyWarrior: 10 year old girl used as a suicide bomber in likely Boko Haram 
Nigeria NYE attack #IslamIsTheProblem #BanIslam]. 
Altogether, the frames that emerged from the analysis of tweets demonstrated how 
social media platforms such as Twitter empower individuals to express anti-
establishment views in ways not possible on legacy media platforms.  
The foregoing discussion was undergirded by one of the objectives of this study, 
which was to address the reliability and validity challenge of framing through the use 
of the approaches suggested by Matthes and Kohring‘s (2008) and Frederick, 
Pegorano and Burch (2016).  These methods proved viable and led to the location of 
five divergent and convergent terrorism-related frames in newspaper and Twitter 
texts. Two frames, the war against Boko Haram and morality, were prevalent on both 
platforms while the social consequences and economic consequences, and the war 
against women were prevalent in newspapers and on Twitter respectively. It is worth 
pointing out that there were subtle differences in the tone and direction of newspaper 
and tweets in the convergent frames. For example, in the war against Boko Haram 
frame, the president was singled out for positive coverage in the newspapers 
published in the northern hub. Although the military received accolades for their 
gallantry in the fight against Boko Haram, it was the president who was lavishly 
celebrated in reports of counterinsurgency programmes. He was portrayed as a 
warrior who defeated the insurgents in fulfilment of his campaign promise, while ex-
president Goodluck Jonathan was vilified for allegedly facilitating the proliferation of 
the sect.  In contrast to the northern press, the southern-based newspapers 
attributed victory to the military. The variance in direction could be explained by the 
ethno-religious cleavages that underpin Nigerian politics and journalism.  
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The morality frame also conveyed different undertones. This frame was prevalent in 
The Guardian and The Punch, the southern newspapers. The publications described 
members of Boko Haram as Islamic fundamentalists. The northern papers, in 
contrast, labelled them as miscreants, criminals, and troublemakers. The lexical 
choice of labels was instructive. As explained earlier, northern Nigeria is home to 
Islam.  For Muslims in the north, attributing the group‘s acts of violence to their 
Islamic faith would have raised questions about the assertion that Islam is a religion 
of peace. Thus, describing the conflict as a war between criminal elements and law-
abiding citizens, could have been an attempt to distance their activities from Islamic 
ideologies and practices. For the southern press, the labelling of members of Boko 
Haram as Islamists, in addition to associating the group with Islam, could also have 
been an attempt to present it as a northern problem.  In fact, an army spokesperson, 
in an interview with The Punch, attributed the emergence and sustenance of the sect 
to the northeast (Akinloye, 2017).   
The emergence of convergent frames: war against Boko Haram and morality, might 
have been shaped by the context of our study and the Nigerian media ecology.  
Firstly, our study covered the month of January when news about recent 
counterinsurgency success was still making headlines, Twitter represented an 
alternative platform where ‗produsers‘ could express their opinion about the issue.  
While most stories in the press were news or interview-based, thus requiring a 
degree of protocol; tweets presented personal perspective. Secondly, as location is 
one of the numerous factors that influence editorial content, it could be argued that 
this contributed to the emergence of the morality frame in the two southern 
newspapers, and on Twitter.  
The divergent frames, social consequences and economic consequences can be 
categorised as generic frames (Matthes, 2009:350); and indicative of news values 
and journalistic practices. In addition, they might have been used to draw attention to 
Nigeria‘s humanitarian crises, which could attract global attention and financial 
support, considering the country‘s economic situation -   Nigeria had been in 
recession since August 2016 (Martin, 2016).   
As noted earlier, one of the frames identified on Twitter, war against women, was not 
visible in the newspapers. The emergence of this frame signifies the difference 
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between legacy and social media. Unlike social media, the legacy media are subject 
to institutional positions. Moreover, they have established identities and are 
restricted by internal and external factors such as ownership and operational 
environment. As a global platform Twitter is not constrained by the limitations that 
are embedded in the content production process of newspapers. ‗Produsers‘ on 
Twitter have no institutional positions to protect. They also have fluid and fuzzy 
identities and even journalists who use Twitter often do that in their personal capacity 
and not as a voice of their media organisations.  
Conclusion 
This study set out to explore the framing of Boko Haram, a transnational terrorist 
group, in a selection of newspapers and Twitter through the use of innovative 
approaches to content analysis. Matthes and Kohring‘s (2008) hierarchical cluster 
analysis approach aided in the identification of frames in newspapers while the 
Leximancer software expedited the analysis of a larger set of texts, a feat that would 
have been difficult to execute using the first approach, due to the volume of texts 
involved.  For example, there would have been a need to apply sampling techniques, 
which may have increased the likelihood of bias. Although both approaches allow for 
some elements of subjectivity, they, however, contribute to the transparent means of 
identifying frames within text, thus minimising the reliability and validity challenges of 
framing research. It is worth noting that we acknowledge that quantitative methods 
do incorporate some measures of subjectivity, for instance, while the cluster analysis 
enables the grouping of different articles, the labelling and interpretation of frames is 
a subjective decision. This often entails reviewing articles to interrogate latent 
meanings in each frame. The qualitative analysis of the frames enabled us to go 
beyond the data and drill deeper into the text to understand embedded meanings in 
the frames and explain their context. Pulled together, the two approaches made it 
possible to identify clusters of articles and tweets that had similar frame elements 
and consequently to detect emerging frames.  
This study has highlighted the relevance of social media platforms in the framing of 
issues of public interest and while newspapers have continued to dominate the 
media space, it is important to acknowledge the growing relevance of alternative 
platforms in shaping and influencing the opinion of their users.  Although it is 
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possible to exaggerate the impact of Twitter, the number of relevant tweets during 
the timeframe of the study suggests that the platform provides a forum for the 
politically engaged. The frames that were identified demonstrate the differences 
between the two platforms even in instances of convergence. While convergence 
between legacy and social media platforms does exist, unearthing divergences has 
the potential to reveal a different version of reality. This was apparent in the ways in 
which the two platforms presented Nigeria‘s ongoing battle against the Boko Haram 
insurgency.  
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